I. Introduction
The celebrated Modigliani-Miller (hereafter MM) proposition that the value of the firm depends on its profitability and not on its capital structure (Modigliani and Miller 1958) is avowedly an application to the field of finance of the doctrine that money is neutral. The broad purpose of this paper is to call into question the claim for the neutrality of money in the particular case of the money-contract relationship represented by corporate gearing, 1 by invoking essentially the same argument as post-Keynesians use to dispute it in the general macroeconomic case: that, in a monetary production economy operating under conditions of intractable uncertainty and in which firms and households constitute categorically distinct functional entities, money and money contracts have a unique and positive role.
Orthodox capital structure theorists divide into two camps. The `fundamentalists', specifically MM themselves, argue that the world approaches perfection sufficiently closely, or that imperfections are mutually offsetting to a sufficient degree, for gearing not to matter in reality. The `revisionists', including authors of finance texts writing for a wide readership for whom theoretical ingenuity may not necessarily be the highest value, attempt to accommodate, within the confines of orthodoxy, what Edwards (1987 p.1) describes as "(t)he stark contrast between Modigliani and Miller's theoretical analysis and empirical observations of the importance attached to capital structure...by both firms and investors". In essence, their argument is that imperfections are important enough to make gearing matter, that they are in fact the key to understanding why firms make the gearing decisions they do. This paper takes issue with fundamentalist and 1 or leverage in US parlance 2 This statement is perhaps in need of some qualification, since it is not clear that the group of theorists who seek to explain capital structure outcomes in terms of information asymmetries can straightforwardly be classified as belonging to either camp. [For a sympathetic survey of such views, see Edwards (1987) ]. To undertake a full critique of this approach within this paper would be too much of a digression from its central purpose. Suffice it to say that these writers seem to have discovered `facts' about agents' consciousness -that gearing decisions have information content -of which, on all the empirical evidence available, the agents in question, corporate managers and stock market traders, seem blissfully unaware. 3 This is the essence of the argument to be found in Miller (1977) , in which he seeks to vindicate the original MM position against the view which he sees as having subsequently become dominant and which I label `revisionist'. revisionist positions simultaneously 4 . The following statement by post-Keynesian writers Findlay and Williams constitutes a useful point of empirical reference for the discussion as a whole, capturing what could be called the key stylised facts of capital structure:
Firms have target debt ratios, generally expressed in book value terms.....Executives tend to think in these terms. So do their commercial bankers and investment bankers. Rating agencies and loan agreements operate in book value terms. (Findlay and Williams 1987 p.114) The purpose of this paper is primarily critical. Nevertheless, it will be suggested that the elements of a different approach to theorising about capital structure emerge out of the critique presented, which would enable facts such as these to be explained by reference to the real preoccupations of the agents involved rather than by imputing to them concerns which exist only in theorists' imaginations. Within this approach, the imposition by lenders of upper limits on gearing ratios and their predilection for book valuations become understandable as devices for confronting the risk of irrecoverable loss in a world of intractable uncertainty; within these constraints, firms set target gearing ratios as a way of responding practically to the problem of seeking to exploit the advantages as borrowers that their position as producing units in a monetary production economy confers on them, without unduly exposing themselves to these same risks.
In Section II, the case is presented for arguing that, while the orthodox analysis of bankruptcy is a parody of reality, in which the economy is populated solely by `sound concerns', it is in fact the basis on which the neutral money thesis is extended to apply to corporate capital structures. Section III then proceeds to locate the origins of this parody in the dominant stochastic paradigm, which transforms risk, as faced by the firm, into a phenomenon stemming not from the uncertain nature of the economic world it inhabits but from imperfections that may contingently arise within that world. This paradigm is criticised in Section IV on the grounds that an adequate understanding of risk requires an analysis in terms of causes operating to produce change within historical time and cannot be derived from the view of the world it implies, in which events have the status simply of ephemeral accidents. The argument is then developed further in Section V to suggest that the conventional concept of financial risk on which orthodox capital structure theory relies is hollow. In its place, the concept of fear of irrecoverable loss is proposed as offering the key to an alternative understanding of the determination of maximum gearing levels and of the causes of bankruptcy, both of which become explicable in terms of liquidity preference behaviour on the part of creditors. Section VI argues that whilst excessive gearing implies risks to firms themselves which they will wish to avoid, their position of economic f ixity', dictated by their role in production, endows them with a general kind of creditworthiness which they will wish to exploit. The target gearing ratio emerges as a practical response to these conflicting considerations. The conclusion focuses on the implication of the discussion as a whole that corporate capital structures observed in the real world are to be understood in terms not of imperfections which impede the operation of market forces but as the product of essential features of the environment in these forces 4 and, implicitly, also with theories based on information asymmetries. operate.
II. Peculiarities Of The Orthodox Treatment Of Bankruptcy
In the revisionist attempt to reconstruct the possibility of an optimal capital structure out of the void left by MM, the notion that risks to shareholders associated with the costs of bankruptcy increase directly with gearing plays a major role. Bankruptcy costs and their possible implications were explicitly recognised, albeit in a footnote, in the original MM paper 5 . Here they state:
Once we relax the assumption that all bonds have certain yields, our arbitrage operator faces the danger of something comparable to `gambler's ruin'. That is, there is always the possibility that an otherwise sound concern....might be forced into liquidation as a result of a run of temporary losses. Since reorganization involves costs....we might expect heavily levered companies to sell at a slight discount relative to less heavily indebted companies of the same class. (MM 1958 p.465 note 18: emphasis added) Miller (1977 p.262) makes it clear that it is shareholders who will bear the costs of bankruptcy, should they arise. In the same place, he is also at pains to point out that the passage just cited anticipates the revisionists' arguments. Certainly, it captures the spirit of what they are trying to say. For example, consider the comments made by the authors of two finance texts as they attempt to offer interpretations of the revisionist position that will make sense to their readers. Puxty and Dodds (1991 p.298 ) state:
The continuity of that (tax) shield is removed by the presence of..financial risk..It is not gearing per se which is the real culprit here: rather it is the cyclical nature of the earnings which cannot support the gearing, and earlier we referred to the switch between financial surplus and deficit of the whole sector that can occur within a year.
(emphasis added)
Allusion to the cyclical nature of the economy appears to add plausibility to the orthodox analysis by offering one readily understandable reason why earnings variability may arise and why years of poor results may be bunched together.
Levy and Sarnat try in an ingenious way to breathe life into the idea of bankruptcy costs. In very telling fashion, they make it possible to have bankruptcy costs without bankruptcy! They write that:
...by increasing its use of leverage the firm also increases its financial risk and thereby the probability of financial failure......Fortunately, the probability of bankruptcy and its impact on financial decision making can be incorporated...by utilizing a convenient hypothetical device. Suppose that each year the firm...insure(s) 5 in the only (more or less) explicit reference to bankruptcy to be found within it.
itself against the possibility of bankruptcy. Such an arrangement implies that the insurance company will pay the interest (and other fixed charges) in years in which losses are sustained. This assumption allows us to retain the M & M assumption of no bankruptcy while also reflecting the costs of avoiding this risk. (Levy and Sarnat 1978 pp.234-6) Perhaps the last word on how financial failure is conceived in orthodox analysis should be left to Miller, who, in perfect consistency with his earlier writings and those of the other writers cited, noted relatively recently (1988 p.113 ) that:
A run of very bad years might actually find a highly-levered firm unable...to meet its debt-service requirements, precipitating thereby any of the several processes of recontracting that go under the general name of bankruptcy. These renegotiations can be costly indeed to the debtor's estate. (emphasis added) These orthodox accounts of the bankruptcy state share some curious but apparently unnoticed features which assume considerable significance when considered in the light of the analysis of this paper. They are:
(1) the focus on bankruptcy costs and not on bankruptcy per se. In all these accounts, the event of bankruptcy seems in itself to be a rather incidental one and is portrayed as holding no fears for any of the interested parties. Only the costs that might in certain circumstances ensue in the aftermath of bankruptcy are seen to matter.
(2) the presentation of bankruptcy as not necessarily a terminal state and even typically as a passing phase, albeit one that may carry costs with it
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. With the Apostle they seem to proclaim "O death, where is thy sting?" (I Cor 15:55). The impression they create of bankruptcy as an incidental state is thus heightened.
(3) the suggestion that bankruptcy costs, when they are incurred, fall exclusively on shareholders. By implication, bankruptcy, even if arising only in a world in which bond yields are uncertain, carries no threats for debt-holders' wealth.
(4) the depiction of bankruptcy primarily as a cause of subsequent problems (in that it positively worsens shareholders' prospects) not as a consequence of, much less the culmination of, an earlier history of them.
And finally and most importantly (5) the interpretation of bankruptcy as a matter of bad luck, such as could happen to any firm.
This may throw some light on the predilection for vagueness and euphemism shown by those orthodox commentators who insist on referring to such costs as costs of financial distress.
Certainly, something akin to `gambler's ruin' can befall firms: fluctuations in earnings, such as are caused by cyclical downturns, do on occasions create financial embarrassment on a scale which threatens their continued existence, as Puxty and Dodds suggest. Nevertheless, there is something distinctly odd about this portrayal of bankruptcy as a contingency affecting, to use the words of MM quoted above, otherwise sound enterprises, so sound in fact that they could in theory afford to insure themselves against this risk, along the lines suggested by Levy and Sarnat. The essence of the problem is that the analysis implicitly treats the bankruptcy of the basically sound enterprise as if it were the sole possibility. It does so by default since the sound enterprise is the only case orthodox theorists, fundamentalist or revisionist, seem prepared to countenance. And, within this idiosyncratic framework, all the peculiar features of the orthodox account enumerated above acquire a kind of logic: if the firm is basically sound, bankruptcy must be a matter of bad luck, a one-off accident, and a cause rather than a consequence of problems; if the firm is basically sound, there is no reason why bankruptcy should be more than a transitory phase and why it should not, potentially at least, be a bloodless affair. Furthermore if any blood is spilled it will always be that of shareholders: the assets are sound, why should the lenders suffer?
However this all amounts to an attempt to pass off a merely possible case as being the norm. In the real world, bankruptcy primarily represents the fate -a word with significant nuances of finality -of unsound companies, the outcome of an often protracted and inexorable downward spiral in the affairs of a company rather than simply a symptom of a bad patch it is going through, the culmination of pre-existing problems and not the first cloud on the horizon. Since that is so, the conception of bankruptcy as an affliction of sound concerns is patently a caricature and the analysis based on it no more than a parody.
What could have induced such tunnel vision? Pike and Neale inadvertently offer a clue. In clear revisionist vein, they observe (Pike and Neale 1993 p.362 
It may seem surprising..that MM should have omitted liquidation costs from their analysis, but this was a logical consequence of their perfect capital market assumptions. In such a market....the resale value of assets, even those being sold in a liquidation, will reflect their true economic values...as measured by the present values of their future income flows...In other words, the mere event of insolvency is irrelevant, except insofar as it involves a change of ownership.
If markets are perfect and so long as bankruptcy is something that happens only to sound firms suffering temporary losses, it is a matter of supreme irrelevance and so, by implication, is the level of gearing at which the firm operates. Both matter only under imperfect markets. The sanctity of the claim that money is neutral, or at least that it would be in a perfect market, is preserved!
III. Bankruptcy In MM: The Theoretical Basis
Be the ulterior motives of its advocates what they may, it is strange that the orthodox account of bankruptcy has been in circulation for so long without apparently attracting critical attention. The explanation for this state of affairs would seem to lie in the fact that it is grounded in the stochastic model of risk and shares vicariously in the prestige of this dominant paradigm in modern finance theory.
MM set out their stochastic wares very early in their analysis. Having defined terms by stating (MM 1958 p.457 ) that "We shall refer to the average value over time of the stream (of income) accruing to a given share as the return of that share; and to the mathematical expectation of this average as the expected return of the share" they enjoin their readers (p.458) to "(n) otice..that the uncertainty attaches to the mean value over time of the stream of profits". This mean or average value is conceived (p.457) as a random variable subject to a (subjective) probability distribution, in fact the joint probability distribution the elements of which are the annual earnings in the income stream accruing to the owners of the firm. Significantly, this stream is "regarded as extending indefinitely into the future" ( ibid.).
Although they do not recognise any such need, certain preconditions must in fact be satisfied if, as MM envisage, the variance of the average return around its expected value is to completely describe risk as perceived by the individual equity-holder. First, the subjectivity of the probability distributions which are seen as governing company earnings must not lead to revisions of parameter estimates during the life of the firm. For otherwise it would be possible for downward revisions to occur, causing potentially drastic falls in company valuations -and another source of risk entirely distinct from variance of returns would be introduced into the analysis. Secondly, serial correlations between earnings in different years must be insignificant. Otherwise, similarly, an additional source of risk would come into existence. For, in that case, a string of poor results might lead, during the life of the company, to a prediction of their continuation and, for this reason too, asset valuations could permanently shift downwards.
It follows that if, as the MM analysis requires, variance is fully to encapsulate risk, estimates, at any point in time, t, of the value of the future earnings of a company (and therefore of the value of the company itself, according to orthodox theory) must be the same at all points preceding t and cannot be influenced positively or negatively by the actual trend in earnings recorded in the period leading to t. This in turn implies that, once having formed an opinion about the future prospects of a company, an agent in the stock market never has reason to alter it. Thus, if a company were initially judged as sound by the market (which must presumably have been the case otherwise flotation would not have been successful) it would always be regarded as such! It is now apparent why bankruptcy is considered within the MM framework only in the context of sound companies: if variance is to say all that needs to be said about company risk then sound companies are all that there can be! To put the point slightly differently, under the risk-asvariance view bankruptcy cannot result from adverse and lasting changes in the conditions under which a once sound firm is seen to be operating, since such changes cannot happen within this framework. Consequently, for bankruptcy to be a possibility at all, some reason must be found for it to befall sound concerns. Now, as Pike and Neale acknowledge (see p. Error! Bookmark not defined. above), temporary losses can produce only a painless approximation to bankruptcy in a perfect market, painless because asset prices would always reflect unchanged earnings expectations. Hence market imperfections have to be invoked to produce a more plausible (to revisionists) bankruptcy scenario, which carries costs for the firms which experience it. With the possibility ruled out that risk might arise because agents have to confront an unknown future, the only alternative is to locate risk in imperfections markets might or might not exhibit rather than in the very nature of the economy. The inescapable conclusion to which the risk-as-variance view leads is therefore that risk ceases to be an integral and inevitable part of economic life. This is a most peculiar world. And it has the feature already noted that it reverses the real cause-and-effect relationship in which deteriorating prospects lead to bankruptcy, transforming bankruptcy into the cause and deteriorating company prospects into the effect.
IV. Roots Of The Bankruptcy Parody: Inadequacies Of The Stochastic Conception Of Risk
In the past four decades, orthodox theory has moved from the guarded position taken by Markowitz (1952 p.89 ) that "if the term risk" were replaced "by variance of return little change of apparent meaning would result" to the unquestioning conflation of concepts in today's finance texts
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. Yet the fact that the two notions have a degree of resemblance does not make the conventional equation of risk with variance self-evidently valid 9 , however much orthodox theorists trade on it to give their analysis an aura of real-world relevance. Given that the orthodox account of bankruptcy has its origins in the stochastic risk paradigm, the peculiarities we have identified in the former raise serious doubts about the way in which the latter reduces risk to variance.
In the MM world, the average return, which the owners of the firm will, over an indefinite time period, receive but about which they are uncertain, constitutes one realisation (in `this' world) of a joint probability distribution formed over the `universe' of possible realisations in all possiblè parallel' worlds.
10 Uncertainty thus attaches to the average-of-the-infinite, which for MM is the return. A `true' distribution exists through parallel worlds of time and space, exercising a constant influence on events. But shareholders are aware of the random nature of this influence: they are troubled by randomness within constancy, as it were, by a state of affairs in which constancy prevails yet outcomes still cannot be known. MM's shareholders see their return as deviating from its expectation, (cf. their definition of expected return cited above) in random fashion from one realisation to another so that they have no reason to think that it will on this `occasion' equal its 8 In fact Pike and Neale (p.179) do not see it as necessary to tell us what risk is, only how it is gauged. They tell their readers as a fact requiring no additional comment that "the risk of the project in isolation, the company and the market are (sic) measured in terms of standard deviations". To illustrate this point, one might note that under the Concise Oxford Dictionary definition of risk as chance of danger, loss, injury, or other adverse consequences' (emphasis added), the notions of upside and downside risk, which are natural corollaries of the risk-as-variance idea, would constitute self-contradiction and pleonasm respectively. 10 to use the terms employed by Davidson (1982-3) in his own illuminating critique of the attempt to force uncertainty in economic life to fit into a stochastic mould. expectation. In other words expectations are literally not expected! 11 What is at issue here is a more than a question of semantics. It is the systematically misleading conception of uncertainty that orthodox theory conditions us into accepting. In the real world, the shareholder confronting uncertainty forms expectations about the stream of returns to be anticipated from a security, based on his appraisal of past, present and future conditions. What concerns him is not that he does not actually expect his expectation, as orthodox theory would seem to imply, but that he may not receive what he does expect, that his expectations may be disappointed, that the unique unfolding of events in the one and only time in which he lives may cause conditions to shift from those he currently anticipates, so that the stream of returns may repeatedly change course and possibly run dry. It is not the unshifting variance of the average-ofthe-infinite around its equally unshifting mean but the possibility of shifts in conditions in finite calendar time, the risk of unique adverse change, which disturbs the shareholder's peace of mind. If that happens, ownership of the share will have committed him to a situation from which he cannot extricate himself without loss.
To summarise, an analysis based on randomness within constancy cannot allow for change in historical time. This, as will now be argued, is because ultimately it violates normal human understanding of the process of causation.
Within descriptive statistics, averages and variances are simply summaries of frequency data, shorthand ways of presenting the results of counting exercises. They are constructions human observers place on events, no more than epiphenomena. The outcome of the next observation to be made is in no sense determined or constrained by the values they currently take: the world has full scope to change in the time that elapses between one observation and another. However, once the step is taken of suggesting that the next observation is a realisation of a probability distribution, and that this distribution governs outcomes over an ensemble of worlds, as Davidson (1982/3 p.189) puts it, an independent and ongoing existence and constancy is imparted to mean and variance, such that, far from being epiphenomena, they become parameters, factors which in a significant sense constrain and control
12
. And because they set limits to the range of possibilities, this seems to justify the use of the term `process' to describe this metaphysical scheme, in which the value of the same variable, the outcome of the `same' event, varies `stochastically' from one occasion in logical time to another, that is, from one `world' to another.
But the notion of process does not sit easily with this view of the world, precisely the view Keynes (1973 p.468) associates with the "Professors of probability (who are) often and justly
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This illustrates the sleight-of-hand with which orthodox finance theorists pass over the essential difference between mathematical `expectation' and expectations as they are held by people living in the real world of uncertainty. In ordinary language the expected return on a share simply represents a summary of the content of agents' forecasts. But in the hands of orthodox finance theorists, the expected return (conceived as the mean of some distribution) turns into a metaphysical entity subsisting unchangingly through time. To conflate the two is, wilfully or unintentionally, misrepresentation.
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In this context it is worth noting that Keynes observed: "I do not myself believe that there is any direct and simple method by which we can make the transition from an observed numerical frequency to a numerical measure of probability" (Keynes 1973 p.400). derided for arguing as if nature were an urn containing black and white balls in fixed proportions". For any such conception transforms outcomes into ephemeral accidents. Such a state of the world is the polar opposite of a process, in which the outcome stands at the end, in time, of a chain of causation and the outcome today is different from what it was yesterday because of prior changes somewhere along the length of that causal chain 13 . Within the stochastic conception, there is, in other words, in place of a process only the isolated, accidental outcome, dissociated from any determining cause/effect relationship with anything that has gone before. As Davidson remarks (1978 p.8) , varying slightly Keynes' analogy: the naive mind might boggle at the basic assumption that each observation in an economic time series is independent in the sense of drawing chips from infinitely large urn with replacement. The `trained mind', on the other hand, never worries about the applicability of such an assumption.
MM can reasonably be interpreted as viewing bankruptcy as arising when the wrong ball (or chip) emerges from nature's urn on one particular drawing or one several successive ones, gearing serving to increase the proportion of balls or chips that count as wrong. It is now clear why bankruptcy for MM is an isolated, chance event and not the result of some process of (adverse) change over time. Within a stochastic framework all events are of this nature: outcomes cannot be the result of causes operating through time, since there are no real processes at work.
V. Financial Risk vs. Risk of Irrecoverable Loss
The traditional theory, whose postulation of an optimal capital structure was the target of the MM critique, relied heavily on the notion of financial risk, which is said to arise because gearing increases the variance of annual earnings per share. MM attempt to distance themselves from any straightforward risk-as-variance notion, insisting (p.458) that: the uncertainty attaches to the mean value over time of the stream of profits and should not be confused with variability over time of the successive elements of the stream. That variability and uncertainty are two totally different concepts should be clear from the fact that the elements of a stream can be variable even though known with certainty...(T)he effect of variability per se on the valuation of the stream is at best a second-order one which can safely be neglected for our purposes (and indeed most others too).
13
In an infinitely complex world, explanation -valid symbolic linking in the human mind between events and the conditions which produce them -is not easily come by. As a result it is sometimes useful, in contexts which are sufficiently repetitive, to sidestep our ignorance by means of a method of analysis which treats outcomes as random events, as accidental variations impossible to determine ex ante, around an essentially extra-temporal central tendency. But to imagine that such a method is appropriate to the world of finance is crass scientism, as Findlay and Williams (1985) insist.
The argument that earnings variance is a second-order consideration is surely valid. For positive and negative deviations of annual returns around a given mean will have mutually offsetting effects on the present value of shareholders' wealth. In a perfect market, shareholders can therefore sell assets (or borrow on the strength of them), at no disadvantage to themselves, should a (temporary) dip in earnings leave them short of funds. The term financial risk therefore denotes what is, at worst, a matter of minor inconvenience, by comparison with the benefit of higher average earnings per share which, cet. par., higher gearing produces. The word risk is essentially a misnomer in this context.
Yet MM are not in a position to wash their hands entirely of this concept. For financial risk lies at the heart of their `gamblers' ruin' analogy (cf. the discussion in Section II above). Without it they would not be able to offer even this rationale for the existence of the phenomenon of bankruptcy. However, extending the notion of financial risk to incorporate a possibility of bankruptcy does little, per se, to make it any the more substantial. For, suppose a firm has experienced a string of poor earnings figures as a result of which it faces difficulties in meeting lenders' claims. The institution of insolvency proceedings would then be the creditors' prerogative, but it is not clear that they would automatically choose to exercise it. Indeed, why, in a perfect capital market, should creditors of an `otherwise sound' company (such as is the universal state according to the stochastic model) ever be induced to do so? They would know that the current difficulties faced by the company had no implications for the market value of their claims and that it was simply experiencing the downside, ex hypothesi temporary, of a volatile situation. And should the situation described have arisen at a time when individual creditors needed cash, they could realise funds without loss either by selling claims or borrowing on the strength of them.
It is now apparent why Pike and Neale are able to state (cf. the quotation in Section II above) that, in a perfect market, insolvency is irrelevant. It is irrelevant because in such conditions it could not rationally occur. In an imperfect market, furthermore, it might be the case that forcing a company into liquidation represented the only means of monetising their wealth that was available to creditors. Yet taking such a step would do nothing to increase it, given the orthodox premise that the company is `otherwise sound'. That creditors should take action of this kind would therefore be inexplicable unless it were also assumed that they were facing liquidity problems of their own, (for example, that they too were financially distressed). Hence, to produce a remotely plausible account of bankruptcy even under imperfect markets, orthodox theory must make very special assumptions about creditors' circumstances.
Patently, the concept of financial risk is a hollow one, logically dependent on a notion of bankruptcy which has been shown to amount to no more than a parody. A more positive aspect of the analysis supporting this conclusion is the alternative concept of risk of irrecoverable loss that can be derived from it. In the remainder of this section it is first suggested that this concept offers useful insights into the historical origins and practical function of the institution of the gearing ratio. On that basis, the case is then developed for arguing that the notion of liquidity preference can offer the key to understanding a number of salient `facts of capital structure' which defy explanation in orthodox terms, namely:
(i) the imposition by lenders of maximum gearing ratios (ii) the positive correlation between gearing ratios and the proportion of tangible assets in corporate balance sheets (iii) the preference, on the part of both firms and lenders, for book value measures of gearing.
Finally, in this section, the suggestion is put forward that the event of bankruptcy itself can be understood as the result of an expression of lenders' liquidity preference in the face of risk of irrecoverable loss.
When an agent initially decides to resource an activity he will have a view of what will constitute a satisfactory return from it, a minimum level of return which would, if achieved, justify the choice of this activity in the face of alternative possibilities. If returns fail in the event to reach this satisfactory level, if there is no prospect that they will be compensated by better than satisfactory results later on, and a fortiori if results seem set to continue poor or worsen further, 14 then in Keynes' words "in the light of the revised expectation, it was a mistake to have begun" (Keynes 1936 p.48) . This mistake will be irreversible and will be capitalised in the form of a fall in the value of the agent's assets from which there is correspondingly no prospect of recovery. The diminution in his wealth will therefore constitute an irrecoverable loss 15 -the world may never again be the same for him. Furthermore the mere possibility that earning prospects may be on the verge of an irreversible decline may be sufficient by itself to generate losses of this kind.
Actual or prospective deteriorations in earnings of this irreversible kind, such that the capital the firm has accumulated in the past becomes inappropriate, presuppose that unique, historicallyspecific, changes in its conditions of demand, supply or both may occur. They are incompatible with the MM assumption of the eternally sound concern, for they cannot be accommodated within a conception of risk as the unshifting variance of outcomes around an unshifting mean. They belong to a world in which adverse movements in company results between one year and the next need not be ephemeral, stochastic accidents but may be indicative of long term problems precisely because they are causally linked to these changes in conditions, which will have lasting effects through time. In a world of uncertainty, it is impossible to assign probabilities to such changes and indeed even to foresee with any accuracy the forms they might take. The risk of irrecoverable loss is emphatically not quantifiable.
In the case of a totally ungeared company, this risk is borne exclusively by the ownersthere is no-one else to share it. Orthodox preoccupation with the notion that gearing increases equity-holders' `financial risk' distracts attention from the fact that, by substituting debt for their own equity, owners with limited liability effectively transfer part of the risk of irrecoverable loss 14 i.e., if poor results cannot be ascribed to MM-style `bad luck '. 15 This notion can be seen as a logical underpinning to Kalecki's Principle of Increasing Risk, which he attributes primarily to "the fact that the greater is the investment of an entrepreneur the more is his wealth position endangered in the event of unsuccessful business" ( Kalecki 1937 p.442) . For the greater is the investment, the greater is the possible extent of the irrecoverable loss. It also has clear affinities with Shackle's notion of a crucial experiment as popularised by Davidson (cf. Davidson 1978 and 1982-3) .
onto the shoulders of others. They can lose no more than they put in, and financing with debt means they put less in. The peculiarity of the suggestion implicit in the orthodox account that bankruptcy, via bankruptcy costs, matters only to equity-holders and not at all to debt-holders now becomes starkly obvious. For the irrecoverable loss creditors may face, should adverse changes in the firm's fortunes lead to bankruptcy, will be a matter of the utmost concern to them. And, once the theoretical basis is established for recognising that lenders, too, face inherently unquantifiable risks, the empirical observation that they commonly seek safety in limiting their financial commitment as a proportion of the company's total assets becomes readily understandable
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. Insisting on limits to the firm's gearing enables them to contain the risk of irrecoverable loss they run, in that, by enforcing a liquidation, they can then reasonably expect to be successful, in extremis, in realising the full value of funds they have committed to the business.
In fact the very origins of the practical concept of a ge aring ratio can be located in creditor fears of the bankruptcy state. A gearing ratio is a measure of asset cover, in other words a measure of creditors' ability to emerge from a bankruptcy state unscathed. It gauges not the likelihood of disaster but the degree to which creditors would be safe, should disaster strike. Only neo-classical theorists obsessed with seeking the holy grail of an optimal capital structure (or with proving that none exists) could imagine that gearing is a measure of risk.
Lenders therefore commonly set, that is they impose, maximum gearing ratios, so as to safeguard themselves against irrecoverable loss in a bankruptcy state. As a device for making the value of creditors' claims more certain, maximum gearing ratios, can therefore be viewed as an expression of liquidity preference in a world of intractable uncertainty. In a footnote, even MM hint darkly at this possibility. They remark (MM 1958 note 17 pp.464-5) "that interest rate increases by themselves can never be completely satisfactory to creditors as compensation for their increased risk (as gearing rises)", reasoning that: Such increases may...become self-defeating by giving rise to a situation in which even normal fluctuations in earnings may force the company into bankruptcy. The difficulty of borrowing more, therefore, tends to show up...in the form of increasingly stringent restrictions imposed..by creditors; and ultimately in a complete inability to obtain new borrowed funds... The idea that fluctuations in earnings, normal or otherwise, are likely to be a critical factor setting a company on the path to bankruptcy is questionable, as we have already argued. However, if, in this quotation, the reference to normal fluctuations in earnings were replaced by the phrase modest downturns in normal levels of earnings, the observation MM make would be fully consistent with the analysis presented here.
Even as it stands, the quotation points to the paradox that while interest may be sought as compensation for independently existing risk, charging interest has the effect of generating further risk of its own. It adds a further dimension to our understanding of why lenders in the real world may choose to impose gearing limitations. For, not only will they be concerned for the safety of their investments in the bankruptcy state, as has already been argued, but they will also be keen to prevent that state arising in the first place. One way in which they commonly seek to do so is to require adequate interest cover (or operational gearing as it is sometimes called), i.e., to insist that companies' earnings are adequate to support the level of debt servicing to which their borrowing commits them. But of course interest cover falls as gearing rises and will fall all the more sharply if higher gearing is accompanied by higher interest rates. At a certain point, lenders will regard the minimum level of interest cover consistent with safety as having been reached. It follows that, beyond that point, the offer of higher interest will cease to compensate for additional risk and will fail to induce increased lending
17
. Maximum gearing ratios conflict with the normal presumption of orthodox finance theory that there is always a price at which funds will be forthcoming. The intellectual origins of that presumption are to be found in the axiom of gross substitution, which, as Davidson (1992 p.24) insists, is incompatible with Keynes' notion of liquidity preference. His argument is that, when demand for liquidity increases, no amount of price changing will be sufficient to produce a substitution of "the products of industry" for liquidity. The argument of this section is exactly analogous: when gearing ratios are too high or interest cover is too low, no amount of extra interest will be sufficient to induce lenders to accept the substitution of risky financial assets for liquidity.
Orthodox theory also has evident difficulty accounting for the fact that "(f) irms holding valuable intangible assets or growth opportunities tend to borrow less than firms holding mostly tangible assets" (Myers 1984 p.586) . This state of affairs becomes readily understandable in the light of the analysis developed in this section. For the character of a company's assets will be of relevance in determining the maximum gearing ratio lenders will accept. The less readily resaleable these are, the greater will be the risk of irrecoverable loss or, in other words, the more liquidity will be forgone in the act of lending. Correspondingly, the stricter will be the limitations on gearing that lenders will impose. Furthermore, since lenders will regard the company's tangible assets as their main bulwark against the risk of irrecoverable loss in a bankruptcy state, it is natural that they should show a preference for computing gearing ratios on a book value basis. For, as Myers (1984 pp.586-7) observes, "book values reflect assets-in-place (tangible assets and working capital)".
The decision to enforce a `liquidation' can also be understood as essentially an act of liquidity preference. Bankruptcy is, on this interpretation, not an event which occurs as a result of a random default by a company. Rather, it arises either ( i) when default is taken by creditors as evidence of adverse changes in the conditions under which a company trades such that continued commitment of resources to it seems to carry too great a risk of irrecoverable loss or (ii) when such evidence has already accumulated and the default offers a sought-after escape opportunity. Seen in this light, it is squarely the culmination of the company's existing problems not the start of them.
VI. Gearing, Lenders and the Favoured Position of Corporate Borrowers in a Monetary
17 Furthermore, as none other than MM themselves assert (MM 1958 p.454) , "No satisfactory explanation has yet been provided..as to what determines the size of the risk discount and how it varies in response to changes in other variables". This is arguably because, as I have suggested elsewhere (Glickman 1994 p.345) , in the real world of fundamental uncertainty, precise, systematic mapping of risk to return is an impossibility.
Production Economy
The analysis of the preceding section suggests that the choices open to the firm in the matter of capital structure are constrained by liquidity preference on the part of lenders, which leads them to set an upper bound to the range of such choices. The discussion in this section extends that analysis to argue that the firm's choice of target gearing ratio, subject to this constraint, represents the resolution of two conflicting considerations: ( i) the risks the firm itself faces as a result of increasing its gearing excessively and (ii) the favoured position the firm will enjoy as borrower by virtue of its role in a monetary production economy, which militates in favour of higher gearing.
The first of these considerations requires only brief comment. A given adverse change in the conditions under which a firm trades will have a proportionately more serious impact on the earnings attributable to the firm's shareholders the higher is the firm's gearing. Furthermore, the more highly geared the firm, the more modest the deterioration in its trading conditions that will be sufficient to make it unable to meet its debts as they fall due and therefore threaten its survival. On both grounds, the higher the gearing, the more sensitive the value of the firm's equity is likely to be to adverse changes in the conditions under which it trades. Those responsible for the firm's financial strategy are likely therefore to respond to these implied risks 18 by setting limits to the maximum debt ratios they are prepared to accept. These internally determined maxima will become operative if they are lower than any upper bound on gearing that lenders may impose.
Turning now to the factors which encourage the firm to raise its gearing level towards these limits, we may begin by noting that in the MM arbitrage parable, no explicit consideration is given to the position of the lender who is called upon to provide funds for arbitraging households as well as corporations. Their initial assumption that the income "on all bonds (including any debts issued by households for the purpose of carrying shares)...is regarded as certain by all traders" (MM 1958 p.459)" is stated without elaboration. Later on in their paper ( ibid. pp.465-6), they assert, quite cursorily, that corporations should not be able to borrow at more advantageous rates than arbitraging institutions or, if they can, that it should not matter. Here, again, lenders do not warrant a mention. Finally, in their `gamblers' ruin' analogy (discussed in Section II above), MM consider the possibility that corporate bonds may not have certain yields. But there is no reference to bonds issued by households in this passage and, once again, lenders do not figure at all in the discussion.
These omissions are arguably serious. From the point of view of the lender, funding the corporation will differ qualitatively from funding the MM-style arbitrageur in that, as a general rule, the former will buy real assets with the funds provided whereas the latter's exclusive interest will be in acquiring financial assets. Now real and financial assets differ crucially in their degree of liquidity. Post Keynesian theory demonstrates that this is no accident. Davidson (1978 p.68) points out that "(S)avers are interested in titles to wealth only as a store of value, while entrepreneurs desire the flow of productive services from capital goods" ( ibid p.68). He explains how potential conflicts of interest between savers and entrepreneurs are avoided via the money-contract institution of the marketable share, which makes it possible to buy and sell titles to unspecified parts of the company's real assets in organised markets without in any way affecting the company's use of those 18 which, despite certain superficial similarities, should not be confused with the conventional notion of `financial risk', for they have nothing whatsoever to do with the variance of returns around a postulated unchanging mean. assets (ibid., pp.59-69).
The firm is thus society's repository of real and therefore illiquid productive assets. But more than this, it makes a whole range of lengthy strategic, organisational and contractual commitments to achieve subsequent sales of specific real outputs. It is the embodiment of the fact that real assets last over time and that production takes time. As a result the firm is a position of relative `fixity'. This, it is reasonable to suggest, gives it four distinct advantages, in the eyes of potential lenders, vis-à-vis the arbitraging individual.
First, lenders prefer to advance funds on the security of specific assets (for the very good reasons discussed on p. Error! Bookmark not defined. above). A firm can be reasonably comfortable about offering the real assets it wishes to buy as security for the loans which will enable it to buy them. Doing so does not interfere with its essential purposes: the assets are required to be held and used. Analogous to the security the firm might offer, it is possible to conceive of a contract in which an MM-style arbitrageur specified the shares he intended to buy and committed them as collateral for a specified (and presumably lengthy) period. But this is not a prospect he could look upon with equanimity. To acquire assets whose whole raison d'être is their liquidity and simultaneously to sign this liquidity away would be an inherently perverse act. Furthermore, a personally-geared acquisition of an ungeared company's shares, if subject to such conditions, would cease to be the economic equivalent of a personally ungeared purchase of shares in a geared company of identical business risk.
Secondly, even in the absence of any formal charges on a firm's physical assets, their very illiquidity will restrict its ability to embark on `adventures' by disposing of them and using the funds for some purpose of which the lender does not approve. Imperfect though these constraints may be from the lender's point of view, they are of some real value. They serve to place the firm in a risk class separate from and more favourable than that occupied by the arbitraging individual, the liquid character of whose asset portfolio does not constrain him to any degree at all from engaging in adventurism of this kind.
Thirdly, the firm is constrained by its past as well as by the nature of its assets in a way in which the individual is not. Not only will its assets be long-lived and highly specialised but it will of necessity have very particular experience in the production of commodities and a nexus of contracts and relationships which will also be highly specific. This history will itself place significant limits on the range of choice it has over its future courses of action. Whilst this does not automatically make the firm a good credit risk, the fact that its past is what it is provides some kind of basis for assessing the creditworthiness of its future. This basis is entirely missing in the case of the arbitraging individual, who is incomparably freer of his history and therefore a much more enigmatic prospect for any lender to assess.
Finally, compare the position of a lender to a geared company in a bankruptcy state with that of a lender to an arbitrageur who has bought shares in a similarly bankrupt ungeared company in the same `risk class'. The lender to the company has priority over its shareholders in the queue for the firm's real assets. The lender to the arbitrageur has at best priority only in the queue for that individual's shares. But acquisition of those shares gives him no priority in the queue for the real assets of the company whose shares the arbitrageur has bought. He will have to stand in line with the other shareholders. As far as the company is concerned he is a shareholder! To summarise, the firm in a monetary production economy represents commitment: the individual does not. The firm's physical assets can be offered as security and they symbolise its general fixity, the fact that its past and present hugely constrain its future freedom. These considerations, together with the fact that only loans made directly to the company confer a priority claim in bankruptcy, mean that in a world in which MM-style arbitrageurs tried to operate, they would find that the terms on which they could command loans would be systematically inferior to those offered to firms. In the interests of shareholders, firms will wish to increase their indebtedness to take advantage of this differential. The target gearing ratios they set reflect the judgements they make as to how far it is safe to do so. The keystone of this argument is that there are fundamental differences between firms and individuals which go totally unrecognised within the MM analysis. The methodological implication is clear. The ability of firms to borrow more cheaply than arbitraging individuals cannot be dismissed as arising from some mere market imperfection, in the absence of which theorists can still quite happily conceptualise the economy. Rather, without the differences between firms and individuals which lead lenders to favour the former, a monetary production economy cannot even be imagined. It is in these differences that the advantages of gearing to the company originate.
VII. Conclusion
To account for the stylised facts of company finance, neoclassical theorists are obliged to attribute them to `imperfections', factors of secondary importance and incidental in nature which impinge on financial choices only contingently and which are not essential to the fundamental logic of the operation of pure market forces. As Solow (1980, pp.1-2) has observed:
..the vocabulary can be revealing. Market `imperfection' suggests a minor blemish of the sort that can make the purchase of `irregular' socks a bargain.......The common generic term for the reason why markets are missing is `transaction costs'. That sounds rather minor, the sort of thing that might go away in due course as accounting and information processing get cheaper.
In challenging the neutral money view in its original and revisionist forms, this paper seeks to reject the conventional wisdom that the decisions which determine firms' capital structures depend on factors which are in some sense superficial in relation to the economy in which they operate. Its thrust is that gearing matters not because of imperfections which prevent the operation of pure market forces but because of essential features of their operation. It offers an alternative perspective within which the determination of gearing levels can be understood in terms of two central and inescapable characteristics of a monetary production economy, the intractable uncertainty of its environment and the unique position of fixity of the firm within it. These characteristics, we have argued, create conditions which limit the extent to which the firm can raise its gearing level but which, within those limits, tend to make higher rather than lower gearing a desirable option. The firm attempts to resolve the conflicts inherent in this situation not by searching for an optimal capital structure (a concept which lacks meaning in a world of uncertainty) but by setting itself a target debt ratio which seems likely to produce a workable compromise.
In a not too dissimilar context, John Weeks has remarked that:
Placing the burden of proof upon the critics of neoclassical market theory is reminiscent of the position of the Catholic Church during the Copernican revolution. While direct observation made it obvious that heavenly bodies did not move around the earth in perfectly circular orbit, all the burden of proof fell upon the critics to show why a geocentric theory was not valid. (Weeks 1989 p.44) That burden of proof has been accepted and, it is hoped, amply discharged within this paper. But the inevitable result is that the positive account of the facts of capital structure that it offers is considerably less well developed than the critique of the conceptual world postulated by MM which is its primary concern. Nevertheless, if that critique is valid, finance managers can be seen to be doing what all along they have thought they were doing -operating with gearing ratios designed to produce sensible, workable, survivable results in an environment of intractable uncertainty. This conclusion may hold less fascination for some than an abstract/deductive tour de force and it lacks the grace of an argument couched in refined mathematics. Yet it is not just theory-less `common sense'. Its starting point is the stylised facts of business life and it is informed by the sophisticated core of post-Keynesian theory, which recognises the unique position of the firm in the economy, takes uncertainty as a given and avoids the question-begging methodology of s tochasticism'.
